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INTRODUCTION
2006 was the most violent year in Iraq since the U.S.-led
multinational force invasion in March of 2003. The February 2006
bombing of the Golden Dome Mosque at Samarra by extremists was
generally viewed as the catalyst for wide scale ethno-sectarian
conflict throughout Iraq. 1 Through 2006, U.S. troop deaths increased

* J.D., Harvard Law School; B.A., Yale College. The author served as a legal
adviser to the U.S. Ambassador to Iraq from January to November 2007. The
views expressed in this article are solely those of the author and do not represent
the views of the U.S. government.
1. See Robert F. Worth, Blast at Shiite Shrine Sets Off Sectarian Fury in Iraq,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 23, 2006, at A1 (reporting that on February 22, 2006, a bomb
destroyed the dome of the Golden Mosque of the Askariya Shrine in Samarra, Iraq,
one of Iraq’s most important Shi’ite shrines, as it is the burial site for two of the
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to 3,003 and Iraqi ethno-sectarian civilian deaths are estimated to
have increased to more than 150,000. 2 American disaffection with
the war also grew to its highest point since the original invasion. 3
The congressional midterm elections of 2006 in which the
Democrats took control of Congress from the Republican Party were
viewed as a repudiation of the war. 4 The increased violence in Iraq
and decreasing public support for the war led to calls from the public
and the new congressional majority leadership for President George
W. Bush to draw down troops and modify the Iraq war strategy. 5
Despite these calls, President Bush did not pursue a strategy that
involved the drawdown of troops. Instead, he approved a strategy

twelve imams revered by mainstream Shiites). The bombing led to a day of
sectarian fury, where mobs retaliated and attacked twenty-seven Sunni mosques.
Id. Iraqi leaders blamed the attack on a terrorist plan to exploit sectarian rifts. Id.
2. See Iraq Coalition Casualty Count, http://icasualties.org/oif (last visited
Sept. 21, 2008) (cataloging the U.S. troop casualty numbers as released by the
Department of Defense); HANNAH FISCHER, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE,
IRAQI CIVILIAN CASUALTIES ESTIMATES 4 (May 16, 2008), available at
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RS22537.pdf (providing various estimates of
Iraqi civilian deaths for differing time periods, while indicating that no concrete
numbers exist for a definitive count of Iraqi civilian deaths).
3. See Susan Page, USA More Pessimistic on Iraq War, USA TODAY, Dec. 12,
2006, at 1A (reporting that a late 2006 USA Today/Gallup poll revealed that
“Americans are increasingly pessimistic about the war and want most U.S. troops
withdrawn within a year . . . [and that] 76% [of] those surveyed say Iraq is in a
civil war,” in addition to a significant majority of Americans doubting the value of
the Iraq war).
4. See Dan Balz & Jon Cohen, Independent Voters Favor Democrats by 2 to 1
in Poll, WASH. POST, Oct. 24, 2006, at A1 (reporting that public opinion polling
conducted days before the election showed that the war in Iraq was considered the
most important election issue by the largest segment of the public); Exit Polls:
Bush, Iraq Key to Outcome, CNN.COM, Nov. 8, 2006, www.cnn.com/2006/
POLITICS/11/08/election.why/index.html (indicating that exit polls showed that
large segments of the public either disapproved of the war or wanted the
withdrawal of troops within some time frame, and that both of these groups broke
heavily for the Democrats).
5. See Adam Nagourney & Megan Thee, With Election Driven by Iraq, Voters
Want New Approach, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 2, 2006, at A1 (stating that “a substantial
majority of Americans expect Democrats to reduce or end American military
involvement in Iraq if they win control of Congress”); cf. Nancy Pelosi, Op-Ed,
Bringing the War to an End is My Highest Priority as Speaker, HUFFINGTON POST,
Nov. 17, 2006, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/rep-nancy-pelosi/bringing-the-warto-an-en_b_34393.html (writing one day after her selection as Speaker-designate,
Nancy Pelosi posted an entry on an internet website, expressing her commitment to
“bringing the war to an end”).
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that increased U.S. troop levels and specified benchmark measures to
assess the Iraqi government’s success at achieving political
rapprochement among its different factions. This Article will
describe the U.S. national security strategy in Iraq during 2007 and
various assessments of the success of that strategy.

I. NEW WAY FORWARD
Shortly after the fall 2006 midterm congressional elections, the
President initiated a formal internal review of Iraq policy among his
national security agencies to obtain policy options on a way ahead in
Iraq. 6 In January 2007, President Bush delivered his long awaited
speech on Iraq, The New Way Forward. 7 In the speech, President
Bush acknowledged that despite the 2005 national elections in Iraq
and the formation of a new Iraqi national unity government 8 in 2006,
6. See Robin Wright, Bush Initiates Iraq Policy Review Separate From Baker
Group’s, WASH. POST, Nov. 15, 2006, at A16 (reporting that on November 14,
2006, President Bush launched an internal policy review among his national
security agencies with the goal of having them recommend options on future plans,
and that the release of the internal policy review was scheduled for mid-December,
to coincide with the release of the independent, bipartisan Iraq Study Group
Report); President George W. Bush, President Bush Meets with Cabinet (Nov. 9,
2008), http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/11/20061109.html (stating
that one day after the Democratic midterm election victory, the President accepted
the resignation of Donald Rumsfeld as Secretary of Defense, and relaying the
President’s announcement that he was “open to any idea or suggestion that will
help us . . . ensur[e] that Iraq’s democratic government succeeds”).
7. President George W. Bush, The New Way Forward in Iraq (Jan. 10, 2007),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2007/01/print/20070110-7.html
(acknowledging that the situation in Iraq was “unacceptable” to himself, as well as
to the American people).
8. Id. (taking responsibility for the failures in Iraq, but asserting that to
succeed, the true path lies with the plans of the Iraqi government). The unity
government was formed based upon provisions in the Iraqi Constitution designed
to to create a power sharing structure within the Prime Minister and President’s
Office supported by Iraq’s various sectarian groups. See IRAQI CONSTITUTION art.
139 (requiring the Prime Minister to have two Deputy Prime Ministers during the
first national electoral term of the Council of Representatives) and IRAQI
CONSTITUTION art. 138 (creating a “Presidency Council” for the first electoral term
of the Council of Representatives, during which period the powers of the President
are shared by a tripartite Presidency Council, consisting of a President and two
Vice Presidents—during 2007, the President of Iraq, Jalal Talabani, was a Kurd
and his two vice-presidents Adil Abd al-Mahdi and Tariq al-Hashimi, respectively,
were Shi’a and Sunni); see also Noah Feldman & Roman Martinez, Constitutional
Politics and Text In the New Iraq: An Experiment in Islamic Democracy, 75
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Iraq had not made the security and political gains that he had hoped
for. He stated that the security environment had deteriorated
significantly, largely as a result of the bombing of the Samarra
mosque. 9 The increase in sectarian conflict and deterioration of
security ran counter to the political reconciliation that he had hoped
would occur after the formation of the national unity government.
Against this backdrop, President Bush determined that U.S. troop
levels should be increased to provide greater security in order to
facilitate greater political reconciliation at the national level. 10 The
strategy was premised on the notion that an increased security
situation would create the breathing space for the Iraqi government
to move forward with key political compromises. The success of the
new strategy, therefore, would be fueled by U.S. investment in troops
and treasure, but ultimately measured by the Iraqi government’s
success in delivering on specific benchmarks.

II. THE SURGE
The temporary troop increase, which became commonly known as
“the surge,” was based upon President Bush’s determination that
increased security, particularly in the area of Baghdad—where eighty
percent of the sectarian violence occurred—was “the most urgent
priority for success in Iraq.” 11 President Bush stated that past efforts
to secure Baghdad had failed because there were not enough
American and Iraqi troops to secure neighborhoods after they had
been cleared of terrorists and insurgents and because the troops were
too restricted in the actions that they could take. 12 He announced that
the new plan developed by his military commanders addressed these
concerns. The plan would put the Iraqis in a lead position in
improving security around Baghdad. Key to the new plan was the
appointment of a new Iraqi military commander in Baghdad who

FORDHAM L. REV. 883, 910-15 (2006) (discussing the genesis of these
constitutional provisions during the constitutional drafting process).
9. See Bush, supra note 7 (accusing Sunni insurgents of destroying the
Golden Mosque to provoke a Shi’a response).
10. See id. (reasoning that an increase in American troops would lead to greater
security in Baghdad, which in turn would make reconciliation possible).
11. Id.
12. Id.
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would oversee the implementation of the plan. 13 The Iraqi
government would deploy eighteen Iraqi Army and National police
brigades across nine of Baghdad’s districts. These forces would work
in concert with the local police to conduct patrols, set up
checkpoints, and gain the trust of Baghdad residents.
President Bush noted that the Iraqis would need additional support
from the United States to carry out their new security plan in
Baghdad. For this reason he committed more than 30,000 additional
American troops to Iraq, with the majority—five brigades—going to
Baghdad, increasing U.S. troop levels in Iraq from 132,000 to over
160,000. 14 President Bush noted that this plan would succeed where
earlier plans to secure Baghdad had not because the Americans and
Iraqis would have the troop levels to hold the areas that had been
cleared of insurgents and terrorists and because of the Iraqi Prime
Minister’s pledge that political and sectarian influence would not
prevent troops from going into neighborhoods that were fueling the
sectarian violence. 15

III. POLITICAL BENCHMARKS
In his January address, the President noted that a successful
strategy in Iraq must extend beyond military operations and that the
United States would hold the Iraqi government to benchmarks that it
had previously announced as indicators of political reconciliation. 16
These benchmarks included holding new provincial elections, the
completion of a de-Ba’athification reform law, the establishment of a
process for constitutional review, and the completion of a
13. Id.
14. Id. Although President Bush announced that 20,000 additional troops
would be deployed in his speech, ultimately 30,000 additional troops were
deployed as part of the surge, bringing troop levels to more that 160,000 at the
peak of the surge in the summer of 2007. See Tim Cocks, U.S. Military Says Iraq
Troop “Surge” Has Ended, REUTERS, July 22, 2008, available at
http://www.reuters.com/article/featuredCrisis/idUSL22490131.
15. See Bush, supra note 7 (warning that the Iraqi government must keep this
and other promises to maintain the support of the American and Iraqi peoples).
16. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-07-1195, SECURING
STABILIZING, AND REBUILDING IRAQ: IRAQI GOVERNMENT HAS NOT MET MOST
LEGISLATIVE, SECURITY, AND ECONOMIC BENCHMARKS 1 (Sept. 2007) [hereinafter
GAO STUDY] (noting that the benchmarks were derived from commitments
articulated by the Iraqi government beginning in June 2006).
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hydrocarbon sharing law. 17 The ultimate goal of “political
reconciliation” was viewed as the coming together of Iraq’s various
sectarian groups—the Shi’a, Kurds, Sunni, and other minority ethnic
and religious groups—to reach political common ground on issues of
national importance to all Iraqis. 18 Provincial elections were seen as
particularly important to the Iraqi public because many Sunnis had
boycotted the earlier national elections. 19 Provincial elections were
viewed as an opportunity to provide the Sunnis with greater political
representation at the provincial level, increase Sunni participation
and commitment to a democratic form of government, and
undermine support for Sunni insurgent groups that opposed the new
national government. The completion of a de-Ba’athification law
was intended to help re-integrate thousands of disaffected former low
level Ba’athists, largely Sunni, back into national civil servant
positions. 20 As many of the difficult political issues that arose during
the constitutional drafting process (such as territorial claims over
Kirkuk and other disputed areas) had been deferred during the
original drafting of the constitution, 21 constitutional review was also
seen as a mechanism through which the various sectarian groups
could make political compromises in working towards a common
objective. Finally, the issue of the distribution of Iraq’s oil resources
was of great import to Shi’a, Sunnis and Kurds throughout the
country. Concluding a law that would provide for the distribution of

17. See Bush, supra note 7 (highlighting these key benchmarks in announcing
the New Way Forward strategy).
18. See GAO STUDY, supra note 16, at 1 (noting that the levels of violence in
2006 undermined efforts to achieve political reconciliation by fueling sectarian
tensions and that the new U.S. strategy was designed to provide the Iraqi
government with the time and space needed to help address reconciliation among
the various segments of Iraqi society).
19. See id. at 31 (articulating that the Sunni boycott resulted in Shi’a and Kurd
provincial councils representing provinces with majority Sunni populations, and
that new provincial elections would rectify this imbalance).
20. See id. at 23-24 (noting that much of the Iraqi technocratic class had been
removed from government under the de-Ba’athification process, angering many
Sunni Arabs, and that U.S. officials sought to differentiate Ba’athist officials who
had committed human rights violations, from those who had merely been members
of the Ba’ath party).
21. See id. at 19 (noting that several contentious issues were not resolved in the
October 2005 constitutional referendum).
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oil resources nationally was viewed as one of the most significant
issues requiring political reconciliation at the national level. 22

IV. CONGRESSIONAL BENCHMARKS
On May 25, 2007, several months after he announced his new Iraq
strategy, President Bush signed into law a troop funding provision
that included eighteen congressional benchmarks to measure
progress in Iraq. The U.S. Troop Readiness, Veterans’ Care, Katrina
Recovery and Iraq Accountability Appropriations Act 23 required the
President to provide two reports to Congress assessing the status of
each of the eighteen benchmarks contained in the Act. 24
Citing President Bush’s statement in his January speech that
“America will change our approach to help the Iraqi government as it
moves to meet these benchmarks” 25 and noting that significant time
had passed since the January address, Congress stated in the law that
it must have adequate reports of the Government of Iraq’s progress
towards meeting various political, military and economic
benchmarks to perform its constitutional oversight responsibilities. 26
Through the passage of this law, Congress effectively enshrined
President Bush’s new Iraq strategy into law. Congress specifically
mandated that:
the United States strategy in Iraq, hereafter, shall be
conditioned on the Iraqi government meeting benchmarks, as
told to members of Congress by the President, the Secretary
of State, the Secretary of Defense, and the Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, and reflected in the Iraqi Government’s
commitments to the United States, and to the international
community. 27
In addition to the political benchmarks announced by President Bush
in January, the law listed several other benchmarks to be considered
in the formulation of U.S. strategy in Iraq moving forward. 28 The law
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

Id. at 25.
Pub. L. No. 110-28, 121 Stat. 112 (2007).
Id. § 1314(b)(2)(A), (D).
Id. § 1314(a)(9).
Id. § 1314(a)(12).
Id. § 1314(b)(1)(A).
See id. § 1314(b)(1)(A)(i)–(xviii) (including goals ranging from the
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required the President to report to Congress on the Iraqi
Government’s success in meeting the enumerated benchmarks and
required the President to report on any revisions that would need to
be made to the political, economic, regional, and military
components of the Iraq strategy should specific benchmarks not be
met. 29
While separate draft legislation considered by Congress would
have directed the redeployment of troops and prevented funding for
any troop increase, 30 the legislation ultimately passed by Congress
and signed by President Bush did not contain explicit troop
withdrawal requirements. Congress, however, included a provision
that would require U.S. redeployment of troops if the sovereign Iraqi
government reached consensus on troop withdrawal and called for
such withdrawal in a resolution. 31 The law also contained a provision
which stated that none of the funds made available for Iraq could be
expended unless the President certified that each of the benchmarks
had been met. 32 The President could waive that restriction by
submitting a written certification with a detailed report containing
the actions that the U.S. government was taking to bring the Iraqi
government into compliance with the benchmarks. 33 The waiver
provision ultimately removed any automatic punitive financial
impact upon the Iraqi government should the benchmarks not be met.
The law required the President to deliver a first status report by
July 15 and a second status report by September 15, 2007.34
Congress directed that the second status report be delivered along
with closed and open session congressional testimony by the U.S.

implementation of amnesty legislation to the reduction of sectarian violence).
29. Id. § 1314(b)(1)(B).
30. H.R. 2237, 110th Cong. § 1 (2007) (directing that the redeployment of
troops begin ninety days after the legislation’s passage and that the redeployment
be completed within 180 days of passage, and prohibiting the use of any funds for
an increase in troops beyond the level in country on January 1, 2007). The
provision ultimately failed by a vote of 171-255. See Final Vote Result for Roll
Call 330, http://clerk.house.gov/cgi-bin/vote.asp?year=2007&rollnumber=330.
31. U.S. Troop Readiness, Veterans’ Care, Katrina Recovery, and Iraq
Accountability Appropriations Act, 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-28, 121 Stat. 112 (2007)
§ 1314(d).
32. Id. § 1314(c)(1).
33. Id. § 1314(c)(2).
34. Id. § 1314(b)(2)(A), (D).
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Ambassador to Iraq and the Multi-National Force Commander.35
Congress also directed that two independent assessments be
completed—the first by the Comptroller General of the General
Accounting Office on the Iraqi government’s ability to meet the
various benchmarks and the second by a private sector contractor
hired by the Department of Defense to assess the Iraqi Security
Forces’ preparation to take over security responsibility within Iraq. 36

V. BENCHMARK ASSESSMENT REPORTS
On July 12, 2007, the White House submitted its initial report to
Congress, containing updates on all eighteen benchmarks. 37 The
measures included the original four benchmarks announced by
President Bush in January: passage of a de-Ba’athification reform
law, constitutional review, a hydrocarbons sharing law, and
provincial elections. 38 Congress further required the President to
evaluate some of Iraq’s legislative action, 39 security related
progress, 40 political stability, 41 and economic self-sufficiency. 42
35. Id. § 1314(b)(3).
36. Id. § 1314(e).
37. See WHITE HOUSE, INITIAL BENCHMARK ASSESSMENT REPORT 9-25 (July
12, 2007), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/iraq/2007/FinalBenchmark
Report.pdf [hereinafter INITIAL BENCHMARK ASSESSMENT REPORT].
38. Id. at 9-13.
39. Id. at 11-15 (enumerating legislative benchmarks including the passage of
an amnesty law and legislation on the formation of autonomous regions, as well as
legislation establishing a disarmament program).
40. U.S. Troop Readiness, Veterans’ Care, Katrina Recovery, and Iraq
Accountability Appropriations Act, 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-28, 121 Stat. 112 (2007)
§ 1314(b)(1)(A)(viii)-(xv) (requiring the President to report to Congress regarding
Iraq’s security situation, such as the establishment of various committees to further
the Baghdad Security Plan, the provision of three Iraqi brigades to assist in
Baghdad operations, the provision to Iraqi military commanders the necessary
authority to execute the security plan, ensuring that the Iraqi military in charge of
the operations applied the law fairly to all parties, ensuring that the Baghdad
Security Plan did not allow outlaws to escape apprehension, reducing sectarian
violence and militia control of local security, establishing the joint security stations
previously planned for Baghdad, and increasing the number of functioning and
independently operating Iraqi Security Force units).
41. Id. § 1314(b)(1)(A)(xvi), (xviii) (dictating that political authorities should
not undermine or make any false accusations against the Iraqi Security Force, and
ensuring that minority political parties have their rights protected).
42. Id. § 1314(b)(1)(A)(xvii) (requiring that Iraq spend $10 billion of its own
revenues for reconstruction projects while at the same time providing essential
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Out of the eighteen total benchmarks, the President’s first report
(July 2007) stated that the Government of Iraq had made satisfactory
progress toward achieving nine of the benchmarks. 43 The
benchmarks in which the Iraqi Government had made significant
progress included: forming a Constitutional Review Committee;
enacting and implementing a regions law; establishing the Iraqi High
Electoral Commission (but not a provincial elections law);
establishing political, economic, and service committees in support
of the Baghdad Security Plan; providing three trained and ready Iraqi
brigades to support Baghdad operations; ensuring the Baghdad
Security Plan does not provide a safe haven for any outlaws;
reducing the level of sectarian violence in Iraq (but not eliminating
militia control of local security); establishing the planned joint
security stations in Baghdad neighborhoods; increasing the number
of Iraqi Security Force units capable of operating independently;
ensuring the rights of minority political parties are protected in the
legislature; and allocating funds to ministries and provinces (but not
spending $10 billion in Iraqi revenue). 44
The report noted that the New Way Forward, embodying the
current U.S. strategy, required the U.S. and Iraqi governments to
fully commit toward a common goal: “a democratic Iraq that can
govern, defend, and sustain itself, and be an ally in the War on
Terror.” 45 The Report characterized the New Way Forward as an
acknowledgement that:
in response to the upsurge in sectarian violence in 2006, it
was necessary for Coalition Forces to temporarily play a
greater role, in conjunction with the Iraqi Security Forces, in
securing the Iraqi population. This is not meant to replace
Iraqi efforts to provide security, but to help provide the
necessary time and space with which the Iraqi Government
can continue to build its own capacity, can intensify efforts
against the accelerants of violence . . . and can meaningfully

services fairly to citizens).
43. See generally INITIAL BENCHMARK ASSESSMENT REPORT, supra note 37
(indicating that the President felt that some progress was being made in all respects
but that as of July 2007 the progress on half of the eighteen benchmarks was
unsatisfactory).
44. Id. at 9-25.
45. Id. at 1.
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address the all-important issue of reconciliation among the
various segments of Iraqi society. 46
The report further noted that the high levels of violence in 2006
threatened political reconciliation efforts and the legitimacy of the
coalition forces and Iraqi government by “fueling sectarian tensions,
[and] emboldening extremists.” 47 The report concluded that amid
such violence, Iraqi leaders had difficulty making the “compromises
necessary to foster reconciliation.” 48
On September 14, 2007, the White House released the second
benchmark report to Congress. 49 In the report, the White House
noted it was assessing whether given all of the facts and
circumstances, the “present trend data demonstrates a positive
trajectory, which is tracking toward satisfactory accomplishment [of
the benchmarks] in the near term.” 50 Some benchmarks with multiple
elements showed mixed progress, as Iraq had only met some
elements of the final benchmark. The report noted that its assessment
metric differed from that of the U.S. Government Accountability
Office’s [G.A.O.] August 2007 report (discussed below) which
determined whether the Iraqi government had met each benchmark
and the status of achievement. 51 Further, the September White House
report was based on information available through September
whereas the G.A.O. report was based on information available
through the end of July. The September assessment recognized
further progress in the same areas noted in the July assessment, as
well as in some additional areas. 52 Although no de-Ba’athification
reform law had yet been passed, the White House now determined
that the Government of Iraq had made satisfactory progress toward
enacting and implementing de-Ba’athification legislation, based
upon the fact that the leaders of Iraq’s five major political groups had
46. Id. at 2.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. WHITE HOUSE, BENCHMARK ASSESSMENT REPORT (Sept. 14, 2007),
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2007/09/20070914.pdf
[hereinafter SECOND BENCHMARK ASSESSMENT REPORT].
50. Id. at 10.
51. Id.
52. See id. (summarizing that the current report assesses seven benchmarks as
not satisfactory and nine benchmarks as satisfactory).
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agreed in principle on draft legislation aimed at re-integrating former
Ba’athists back into the government at an August political leaders
summit. 53 Although legislation had yet to be passed, this agreement
was viewed as a sign of growing political accommodation between
the Shi’a and Sunni communities. Similarly, the September report
also determined that since July, satisfactory progress had been made
toward establishing a provincial powers law. Although legislation
had not yet been passed, the Iraqi political leadership had reached an
agreement at the August summit on a draft law defining provincial
authorities. 54
In the September report, the White House also determined that
partial progress had been made in two additional security
benchmarks. The report assessed that the Iraqi government had made
progress toward giving Iraqi commanders the necessary authority to
execute the New Way Forward strategy and to make the decisions,
both tactical and operational, to pursue extremists; however, the
White House also assessed that there had not been “satisfactory
progress towards [eliminating] political intervention by leaders
throughout the chain of command.” 55 By September, the Prime
Minister had granted the Iraqi and coalition forces all of the
necessary authorities to go after insurgents and militias but political
influence and sectarian behavior at various levels within the Iraqi
Security Forces [ISF] remained. 56 In describing the nature of
sectarian influence within the ISF, the White House reported that the
Prime Minister and senior Iraqi commanders were aware of the long
term security threat posed by militia extremists both in and out of the
ISF. 57 As positive steps, the White House pointed to actions that the
Prime Minister had taken in August to remove sectarian Shi’a
commanders within the ISF in addition to targeting Shi’a militia
groups. 58 The White House also noted that seventeen out of twenty53. See id. at 12 (reporting that in mid-August 2007, the leaders of Iraq’s five
major political parties met to discuss and reach political agreement on a number of
difficult, high priority political issues, including the draft de-Ba’athification
legislation).
54. Id. at 12-14.
55. Id. at 19.
56. See id. (pointing to various methods possibly being used to replace
effective personnel simply because they were Sunni).
57. Id. at 18.
58. Id.

JOHNSON_TO PRINT.DOC

2008]

12/8/2008 10:35:57 AM

2007 IN IRAQ

261

seven battalion commanders in the National Police had been
removed from duty because of suspicions that they had engaged in
sectarian activity since the beginning of the year. 59 Although Iraqi
commanders continued to make choices about which operations to
undertake in part out of fear of being replaced for political or
sectarian reasons, the Prime Minister’s actions against fellow Shi’a
commanders and groups were viewed as encouraging. 60
The White House also reported in September that while the
government of Iraq was now making satisfactory progress toward
ensuring that the Iraqi Army is providing “even-handed enforcement
of the law,” the Iraqi police had not made similar progress. 61 The
White House reported that individual ISF units that worked with
coalition forces generally acted in a responsible manner and that ISF
operations against insurgent cells appeared to target both Sunni and
Shi’a elements. 62 However, the report pointedly noted that some
police units outside of Coalition supervision gravitated toward “old
habits of sectarianism.” 63
Finally, as of September 2007, the Government of Iraq had failed
to make satisfactory progress toward achieving a number of
benchmarks, including enacting a hydrocarbons sharing law,
enacting an elections law, establishing a date for provincial elections,
enacting an amnesty law, establishing a strong militia disarmament
program, increasing the number of ISF units operating
independently, and ensuring that political authorities were not
undermining or making false accusations against ISF members. 64

VI. SEPTEMBER TESTIMONY
On September 10 and 11, 2007, Ambassador Ryan Crocker, the
U.S. Ambassador to Iraq and General David Petraeus, the
Multinational Force Commander, testified before Congress about
how the US Mission and Coalition forces were performing in the

59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

Id. at 19.
Id.
Id. at 20.
Id. at 19.
Id. at 20.
Id. at 10-27.

JOHNSON_TO PRINT.DOC

262

12/8/2008 10:35:57 AM

AM. U. INT’L L. REV.

[24:249

implementation of the New Way Forward’s goals of increased
security and political reconciliation. In Ambassador Crocker’s view:
It is no exaggeration to say that Iraq is—and will remain for
some time—a traumatized society . . . . Iraqis are facing some
of the most profound political, economic and security
challenges imaginable . . . . Some of the more promising
political developments at the national level are neither
measured in benchmarks nor visible to those far from
Baghdad . . . . Our country, however, has come to associate
progress on national reconciliation as meaning the passage of
key pieces of legislation. There is logic to this, as the
legislation we are urging the Iraqis to produce does . . . have
to do with the question of how to share power and resources
among Iraq’s many communities . . . . I do believe that Iraq’s
leaders have the will to tackle the country’s pressing
problems, although it will take longer than we originally
anticipated because of the environment and the gravity of the
issues before them. 65
Ambassador Crocker discussed various central concerns to the future
of Iraq, such as de-Ba’athification reform and provincial powers
legislation. 66 While he was not able to report that any of these
particular benchmark measures had been completed, he discussed the
significance of the resolution of those issues to the Iraqi people and
the significant debates that party leaders were having about each of
those issues. 67 He was encouraged that after much preparatory work
and many days of intensive meetings, Iraq’s five leading national
figures from the Shi’a, Sunni, and Kurdish communities agreed on
draft legislation addressing de-Ba’athification reform and provincial
powers on August 26, 2007. 68

65. Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker, U.S. Ambassador to the Republic of Iraq,
Statement Before a Joint Hearing of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs and
the House Committee on Armed Services 3-4 (Sept. 10, 2007), available at
http://foreignaffairs.house.gov/110/cro091007.pdf.
66. See id. at 3-4 (characterizing the debates surrounding the oil and revenue
sharing laws, de-ba’aathification, and the balance of provincial powers as akin to
those surrounding the American civil rights movement or struggle over states
rights).
67. See id. (asserting that the issue is whether Iraq has the capability to resolve
these fundamental problems).
68. Id. at 4.
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Ambassador Crocker concluded his testimony observing that:
2006 was a bad year in Iraq. The country came close to
unraveling politically, economically, and in security terms.
2007 has brought improvement. Enormous challenges remain
. . . . The changes to our strategy last January—the surge—
have helped change the dynamics in Iraq for the better . . . .
We have given Iraqis the time and space to reflect on what
sort of country they want . . . . Whether Iraq reaches its
potential is of course ultimately the product of Iraqi
decisions. 69
At the same hearings, General Petraeus reported that the majority of
the military objectives of the surge were being met. 70 Furthermore,
he believed that the United States would be able to reduce its forces
to pre-surge levels by the summer of 2008 without jeopardizing the
security gains that had been made. 71 Citing several statistics about
the changing security enviornment in Iraq during the surge offensive,
General Petraeus showed that sectarian violence peaked in December
2006 and since then, civilian deaths of all categories had decreased
by forty-five percent, civilian deaths in Baghdad had decreased by
seventy percent, ethno-sectarian deaths throughout Iraq decreased by
fifty-five percent, and deaths in Baghdad decreased by eighty
percent. 72 General Petraeus also described gains in the security
situation in Anbar Province, fueled by local Iraqi leaders allying
themselves with coalition forces against Al Qaeda; a decrease in the
number of car bombings throughout Iraq; and significant progress in
the targeting of Al Qaeda and its affiliates, as well as Shi’a militia
extremists. 73
In his congressional testimony, General Petraeus also made
several observations about the status of the Iraqi Security Forces,
stating that “[d]espite concerns about sectarian influence, inadequate
logistics and supporting institutions, and an insufficient number of
69. Id. at 8.
70. General David H. Petraeus, Commander, Multi-National Force-Iraq,
Statement Before a Joint Hearing of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs and
the House Committee on Armed Services 1 (Sept. 10-11, 2007) available at
http://armedservices.house.gov/pdfs/FC091007/Petraeus_Testimony091007.pdf.
71. Id. at 7.
72. Id. at 3.
73. Id. at 4.
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qualified . . . officers, Iraqi units [were] engaged around the
country.” 74 At that time, there were nearly 140 battalions of various
Iraqi military forces and police units in the fight, and the vast
majority of those could lead operations 75 and a number of Iraqi units
were operating throughout the country with a minimum of coalition
assistance. 76 General Petraeus summarized several recommendations
that he had made to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the future military
strategy in Iraq, emphasizing the need for coalition forces to secure
the population of Iraq and transition responsibilities to Iraqi
institutions and forces quickly, “without rushing to failure.” 77
General Petraeus noted that two important components remained the
development of the ISF while at the same time advancing the
counterinsurgency strategy, all the while advancing the responsibility
of Iraqis in the effort. 78 As part of this strategy, General Petraeus
recommended a drawdown of surge troops to the pre-surge levels by
mid-July 2008. 79 He stated that he would revisit further rates for
reductions beyond pre-surge levels in mid-March 2008, when he
would have “a better feel for the security situation, the improvements
in the capability of the Iraqi counterparts, and the enemy situation.” 80

VII. G.A.O. BENCHMARK ASSESSMENT
In addition to testimony from Ambassador Crocker and General
Petraeus before Congress, the U.S. Troop Readiness, Veterans’ Care,
Katrina Recovery and Iraq Accountability Appropriations Act also
called for an independent assessment of the Iraqi government’s
success in achieving the various political benchmarks and another
assessment of the Iraqi government’s preparation to take over
security responsibility in the country. 81 The first report, completed by
74. Id. at 5.
75. See id. (indicating that ninety-five percent of the battalions were ready to
take the lead, but that they would require coalition support).
76. Id.
77. Id. at 6.
78. Id.
79. See id. at 7 (emphasizing that continued reductions would continue beyond
summer-2008 reductions to pre-surge levels, but that establishing a pace for those
reductions would be premature).
80. See id. at 7.
81. U.S. Troop Readiness, Veterans’ Care, Katrina Recovery, and Iraq
Accountability Appropriations Act, 2007 § 1314(e)(1).
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the Comptroller General of the United States as the head of the
G.A.O., determined that Iraq had largely failed to meet the
benchmarks called for in the legislation. 82 As of September 2007, the
Government of Iraq fully met only three of the benchmarks and
partially met four of the benchmarks. 83 G.A.O. determined that Iraq
had not made substantial progress towards achieving eleven of the
eighteen benchmarks. 84 G.A.O. concluded that the Government of
Iraq had only completed one of the eight legislative benchmarks—
the protection of minority political parties and partially met the
benchmark of establishing a regions law, since a regions law had
been passed but would not take effect until April 2008. The report
also noted that the government had not enacted legislation on deBa’athification reform, oil revenue sharing, provincial elections,
amnesty, or militia disarmament. 85 In reporting on the G.A.O. study
to Congress, the Comptroller General concluded that as of September
2007, the Iraq government had failed to fulfill its commitments “to
advance legislative, security, and economic measures that would
advance national reconciliation among Iraq’s warring factions.” 86 In
the Comptroller General’s view “the polarization of Iraq’s major
sects and ethnic groups and fighting among Shi’a factions diminishes
the stability of Iraq’s governing coalition and its potential to enact
legislation needed for sectarian reconciliation.” 87 The Comptroller
General also reported that violence remained high in Iraq and that
G.A.O. faced difficulty in assessing whether sectarian violence in
Iraq had decreased since it was unable to measure whether the
perpetrators’ intentions were sectarian in nature. 88

82. See GAO STUDY, supra note 16, at 2.
83. Id. at 3.
84. Id. at 4-5.
85. Id.
86. David M. Walker, Comptroller General of the United States, Testimony
Before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, 12, available at http://www.gao.
gov/htext/d071222t.html.
87. Id.
88. See id. at 9 (citing the administration’s July 2007 report, which indicated a
decrease in sectarian violence but “acknowledged that precise measurements vary,
and it was too early to determine if the decrease would be sustainable”).
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VIII. INDEPENDENT ASSESSMENT OF THE IRAQI
SECURITY FORCES
The report on the Iraqi Security forces conducted by General Jones
USMC (ret.) and the Independent Commission was similarly critical
of the Government of Iraq’s success in implementing the New Way
Forward. 89 Congress mandated that an independent commission
assess the readiness of Iraq’s military and police forces to maintain
the territorial integrity of Iraq, deny safe haven to international
terrorists, bring greater security to the country’s provinces in the next
twelve to eighteen months, and bring an end to sectarian violence to
achieve national reconciliation. 90 The commission was also directed
to report on the overall capabilities of the ISF, including their
training levels, equipment, and intelligence abilities as well as
whether continued assistance by U.S. troops would likely help the
ISF’s ability to fulfill its responsibilities identified by Congress to
ensure security within the country. 91 The independent commission
determined that all of the Iraqi Armed Forces were increasingly
“capable of assuming greater responsibility for the internal security
of Iraq” and that the Iraqi police were improving. 92 The authors also
determined that the Iraqi Security Forces would continue to rely
upon the coalition forces over the next twelve to eighteen months,
and that the ISF would not have the power to protect Iraq from
external threats independent of coalition support. 93 The Commission
was also very critical of the Ministry of Interior, which has
responsibility for the local and national police and the border
enforcement department, describing it as a “ministry in name
only.” 94 The report determined that the ministry was dysfunctional,

89. See REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT COMMISSION ON THE SECURITY FORCES
8 (Sept. 6, 2008) (evaluating the domestic security forces in Iraq as being
unable to meet the goals set for them within the upcoming twelve to eighteen
months).
90. U.S. Troop Readiness, Veterans’ Care, Katrina Recovery, and Iraq
Accountability Appropriations Act, 2007 § 1314(e)(2)(i).
91. Id. § 1314(e)(2)(ii)-(iii).
92. REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT COMMISSION ON THE SECURITY FORCES OF
IRAQ, supra note 89, at 46.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 17.

OF IRAQ

JOHNSON_TO PRINT.DOC

2008]

12/8/2008 10:35:57 AM

2007 IN IRAQ

267

sectarian, and lacked effective leadership.95 In the commission’s
view, the fundamental flaws within the system posed a serious
obstacle to achieving the “levels of readiness, capability, and
effectiveness” necessary for internal security and stability in Iraq. 96

IX. APRIL 2008 TESTIMONY
During their September 2007 testimony, Ambassador Crocker and
General Petraeus reported that the President asked them to provide
Congress and the American people with a further update on the
security and political environment in Iraq in March 2008. 97 On April
8 and 9, 2008 Ambassador Crocker and General Petraeus updated
Congress on the security environment and the Government of Iraq’s
achievements in the area of political reconciliation. 98
In his testimony, Ambassador Crocker provided a new assessment
of the political, economic, and diplomatic progress of the Iraqi
government. 99 Ambassador Crocker observed that a number of
significant accomplishments by the Iraqi government since
September 2007 indicated a positive trend with respect to political
reconciliation. He stated that “[i]mmense challenges remain and
progress is uneven and often frustratingly slow, but there is
progress.” 100 He noted that at the national level, the Iraqi parliament
had passed some key pieces of legislation, including some of the
benchmark measures. Since September the Parliament had passed a
pension law that extends benefits to individuals who had been denied
benefits because of their service under Saddam’s regime, a deBa’athification reform law (the Accountability and Justice Law), and
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. See SECOND BENCHMARK ASSESSMENT REPORT, supra note 49, at 3
(indicating the assessment is to address mission progress, adjustments to military
resources, adjustments to economic assistance, regional and international
contributions, political and security initiatives, and institutional adjustments within
the USG to better support the missions in Iraq).
98. See Karen DeYoung & Thomas E. Ricks, Frustrated Senators See No Exit
Signs, WASH. POST, Apr. 9, 2008, at A1.
99. Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker, U.S. Ambassador to the Republic of Iraq,
Statement Before the Senate Armed Services Committee (Apr. 8, 2008), available
at http://armed-services.senate.gov/statemnt/2008/April/Crocker%2004-08-08.pdf
[hereinafter Crocker Statement, April 2008].
100. Id. at 1.
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an amnesty law. 101 Each of these pieces of legislation were viewed as
key accomplishments in the area of reconciliation—the deBa’athification reform legislation enabled an increasing number of
civil servants under the prior regime to seek government jobs and the
amnesty law was intended to enable certain individuals to move
forward in Iraqi society without being criminally detained,
notwithstanding their former activities as combatants. The Iraqi
parliament also passed a provincial powers law defining the
relationship between the federal and provincial governments and set
the date of October 1, 2008 for provincial elections.102 As the Iraqi
Parliament had begun to pass key pieces of legislation, Ambassador
Crocker observed that as an institution, the Council of
Representatives (COR) was maturing and had begun to resolve tough
problems in a practical way. He noted that “while [Iraqi] politics still
have a sectarian bent and basis, cross-sectarian coalitions have
formed around issues, and sectarian political groupings which often
were barriers to progress have become more flexible.” 103
Ambassador Crocker also noted that the Iraqi unity government
continued to face a number of challenges. He believed that a
reinvigorated cabinet was necessary for political balance and to
improve the delivery of services to the Iraqi people. 104 He also noted
101. Id.
102. Id. at 3. Although the provincial powers law, which established a provincial
elections date of October 1, 2008 passed the Council of Representatives and was
signed into law by the Presidency Council on March 19, a key elections law
defining the electoral framework had not yet passed the Iraqi parliament. There
was concern that an elections law would not pass the Council of Representatives
and receive the ratification of the Presidency Council in time for provincial
elections in 2008. See Erica Goode & Richard A. Oppel, Official’s Shift Raises
Hope for Iraq Elections, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 20, 2008, at A12 (reporting that the
legislation was initially rejected by the Presidency Council, but subsequently
approved by Iraqi Vice President Adel Abdul Mehdi after meeting with U.S. Vice
President Dick Cheney in Iraq); Ned Parker & Caesar Ahmed, Iraqi Election Law
Remains Stalled, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 4, 2008, at A3 (explaining that failure to reach
an agreement by winter 2008 on provincial powers could delay elections to
December 2008).
103. See Crocker Statement, April 2008, supra note 99, at 3.
104. Id. at 6. At the time of Crocker’s testimony, a bloc of Sadrist (Shia) and
Tawafuq (Sunni) had boycotted the Iraqi parliament and the Council of Ministers
(Iraq’s multi-sectarian cabinet). The boycott included Sunni Deputy Prime
Minister Zobaie, who was responsible for overseeing the delivery of basic services
to Iraqis. Since the time of Ambassador Crocker’s testimony, Tawafuq (also know
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that the Iraqi government would need to confront significant issues,
including corruption, disputed internal boundaries, the return of
refugees and internally displaced persons, and the protection of the
rights of minorities and women. 105 As in the political arena, the Iraqi
government had made some advances in its economic policy, but
continued to face challenges. Ambassador Crocker observed that Iraq
had allocated $13 billion for reconstruction and that the United States
would no longer be funding major infrastructure projects. 106 He also
noted that Iraq would increasingly use its own funds to support
projects developed by the United States, such as Iraq’s commitment
of $200 million in support of a program to provide vocational
training for local concerned citizens who had opposed militia
groups. 107 Ambassador Crocker determined that as with the process
of political reconciliation, “Iraq’s economy [remained] fragile, the
gains reversible and the challenges ahead substantial.” 108 Despite
these challenges, Ambassador Crocker stated that the progress he had
seen in Iraq led him to believe that “the strategy that began with the
Surge is working.” 109 He cautioned that while U.S. support would
remain critical that did not mean that U.S. support should be “openended” or that the “level and nature of our engagement should not
diminish over time.” 110
During his testimony, General Petraeus provided an overview of
the security situation in Iraq following the build up of the surge. 111
He reported that:

as the Iraqi Accordance Front) has re-joined the government. See Sudarsan
Raghavan, Sunni Bloc Rejoins Iraqi Government, Amid Reconciliation Hopes,
WASH. POST, July 20, 2008, at A12 (crediting Shiite Prime Minister Nouri alMaliki with the return of the Iraqi Accordance Front, which rejoined the
government partly because they viewed Maliki’s crack down on Shiite militias in
Basra as a sign that he was not sectarian).
105. See Crocker Statement, April 2008, supra note 99, at 6-7.
106. Id. at 8.
107. Id. at 9.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 5.
110. Id.
111. General David H. Petraeus, Commander, Multi-National Force-Iraq,
Statement Before the Senate Armed Services Committee (Apr. 8, 2008), available
at http://armed-services.senate.gov/statemnt/2008/April/Petraeus%2004-08-08.pdf.
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[s]ince September, levels of violence and civilian deaths have
been reduced substantially, Al Qaeda-Iraq and a number of
other extremist elements have been dealt serious blows, the
capabilities of Iraqi Security Force elements have grown . . . .
Nonetheless, the situation in certain areas is still
unsatisfactory and innumerable challenges remain . . . the
progress made since last spring is fragile and reversible . . . .
still, security in Iraq is better than it was when Ambassador
Crocker and I reported to you last September, and it is
significantly better than it was 15 months ago when Iraq was
on the brink of civil war and the decision was made to deploy
additional US forces to Iraq. 112
General Petraeus noted that in addition to the U.S. surge, the Iraqis
had also conducted a surge, adding over 100,000 additional soldiers
and police to the ISF in 2007. 113 He attributed the security
improvements to the increased numbers and capability of the ISF, as
well as the carrying out of counterinsurgency operations by Coalition
and Iraqi forces, and the attitudinal shift among certain elements of
the Iraqi population against Al-Qaeda Iraq’s (AQI) “indiscriminate
violence and extremist ideology.” 114 He believed that this was most
evident in the fact that tens of thousands of Iraqis – including former
insurgents – had chosen to contribute to local security as “Sons of
Iraq.” 115 In his view, their assistance had helped to significantly
reduce the threat posed by AQI. 116 He also cited the fall 2007
ceasefire declaration by Moqtada al-Sadr, the Shiite militia leader, as
another factor in the overall reduction of violence. 117 In his view, the
greatest long term threat to the viability of a democratic Iraq would
continue to be Iran’s funding, training, arming, and directing of
“Special Groups” in Iraq that engage in violent activity.118
In General Petraeus’ view, the nature of the conflict in Iraq
continued to be a competition among ethnic and sectarian groups for
power and resources and that various elements—terrorists,
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.

Id. at 1.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2.
Id.
Id.
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insurgents, militia extremists, and gangs—continued to push that
competition toward violence. Nonetheless, he argued that most
parties realized that the only rational way ahead was through political
dialogue, rather than violent street-fighting. 119 Despite his view that
Iraq remained a violent country, General Petraeus also cited some
statistics to indicate that progress had been achieved in the area of
security. He stated that for almost six months, security incidents had
been at a “level not seen since early-to-mid-2005.” 120 He also stated
that Iraqi civilian deaths had decreased over the past year to a level
not seen since the February 2006 Samarra Mosque bombing which
had set off the devastating cycle of sectarian violence seen in 2006
and early 2007. 121
General Petraeus also reported that the ISF continued to develop
and that the coalition had been able to transfer the security
responsibility of more provinces to the ISF. As of the time of his
testimony, security responsibility for 9 out of 18 Iraqi provinces had
been transferred from coalition control to Iraqi control. 122 He also
reported that the ISF had grown by 133,000 soldiers and the Iraqi
police services had grown over the past 16 months to more than
540,000 individuals. 123 He stated that more than 100 Iraqi combat
battalions were capable of taking the lead in operations with coalition
support. 124 Although greatly improved, General Petraeus determined
that the ISF were not yet ready to defend Iraq or maintain security
throughout the country on their own and he believed that the
improved security remained vulnerable to a resurgence of AQI, a
violation of Moqtada’s ceasefire by Shi’a groups, and further stoking
of violence by Iran and other external actors. 125

119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 4 (emphasizing that these provinces include not only the successful
Kurdish provinces but also “a number of Southern provinces”).
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. See id. at 5 (asserting that these external factors include Iran and actions by
other neighbors that could undermine the security situation).
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CONCLUSION
In his April testimony, General Petraeus assessed that the surge in
conjunction with several other factors, including Moqtada al Sadr’s
ceasefire and the new alliance between the “Sons of Iraq” and
MNF-I against insurgents brought improvement to the security
environment in Iraq in 2007. 126 Nonetheless, the Government of
Iraq’s ability to capitalize on these security gains was sporadic. The
passage of key political reconciliation measures at the national level
was slow and for many measures, remained unrealized.
The premise of the New Way Forward was that increased military
troop numbers and counterinsurgency operations by the coalition and
Iraqi forces would help drive down sectarian violence, enabling the
Iraqi political leadership to enter into compromise “benchmark”
measures that would foster greater political reconciliation among
Iraq’s various sectarian groups. This premise placed extreme
pressure on the coalition forces to improve security, sometimes with
the ISF in the lead, and on the American Mission to convince Iraqi
leaders to pass legislative and other initiatives in an environment
where, Ambassador Crocker once noted, “the Washington clock
seems to be running a lot faster than the Baghdad clock.” 127 This task
came at a period of transition in Iraq—a period in which the former
American—led occupation authority, the Coalition Provisional
Authority, had been replaced by a democratically elected Iraqi
government and the coalition forces had begun to transfer greater
security responsibility to the Iraqi Security Forces.
In essence, the New Way Forward called for greater U.S.
diplomatic and military pressure to achieve results on the ground in
Iraq at the same time that the coalition forces and the embassy had
the obligation to support the Iraqi Government as the sovereign
political authority and, increasingly, as the lead in ensuring the
protection of its citizenry. To prove the New Way Forward a success,
the U.S. military and diplomatic corps were required to demonstrate

126. See id. at 1-2.
127. Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker, Press Roundtable, U.S. Embassy, Baghdad
(May 18, 2007), available at http://iraq.usembassy.gov/iraq/20070518_round
table.html.
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to Congress greater and more specific political, military, and
economic accomplishments, but had to rely upon the Iraqi
Government to ensure that the benchmark measures of success were
achieved.
As the New Way Forward strategy recognized, the Iraqi
Government must reach a point where it can govern independently
and take on security responsibility for its nation. The U.S.
government can play a role in helping the Iraqi government reach
this end state but the question remains—how long can the success of
the U.S. mission in Iraq be measured by the Iraqi government’s
ability to meet benchmarks? In a post-surge environment, new
measurements for success in Iraq will need to be developed as the
U.S. strategy in Iraq is again updated and modified to reflect the
ever-changing environment in Iraq.

